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The current study provides evidence for the dissociation between two types of asymmetries in 
relations within semantic memory: those due to unidirectional associative strength (e.g., 
Kahan, Neely & Forsythe, 1999), and the inherent asymmetry of causal relations (e.g., Fenker, 
Waldmann & Holyoak, 2005). By manipulating the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) in a 
relation recognition task, I demonstrate that expectancy differentially impacts the effects of 
these asymmetries. An asymmetrical directional response time advantage was seen with causal 
relations at both long (1000 ms) and short (150 ms) SOAs, but only at long SOAs for 
unidirectional associates. These data are taken to support the hypothesis that latencies due to 
unidirectional association are a result of the manner in which these relations are accessed, and 
latencies due to the asymmetry of causal relations are reflective of the manner in which cause-
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The manner in which humans represent causal knowledge and how previously learned 
causal relations are accessed in semantic memory has become the focus of increasing amounts 
of research in recent years. Semantic memory is described as our long-term inventory of 
knowledge about the world (Tulving, 1972), including information about categories, features, 
and the complex inter-relations that exist between them (Murphy & Medin, 1985). 
Importantly, one’s understanding of causal relations is also a part of this general semantic 
knowledge base.  There are a number of features of causal knowledge that may set it apart 
from other forms of semantic knowledge. For example, there exists a growing body of 
evidence suggesting that the perception and learning of causal relations is intimately tied to 
basic perceptual processes and action (i.e., dynamic events) that gives rise to the seemingly 
high-level cognitive processing required for causal inference (see Scholl & Tremoulet, 2000 
for review). Furthermore, research from diverse approaches, including phenomenal causality 
(e.g., Michotte, 1963), developmental psychology (e.g., Leslie & Keeble, 1987), and human 
and animal learning (e.g., Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Blaisdell, 2006) has revealed a deep 
understanding of causal relations even amongst infants and non-human animals.  
An important question concerns how such relations are represented in semantic 
memory. There are numerous features of causal knowledge that would lead one to predict that 
it may be dissociable from other forms of semantic relations at the level of representation. 
Most crucially, causal relations are inherently asymmetrical, as the constituent parts of a 
causal relation (cause and effect) have certain non-interchangeable binding roles (Pearl, 2000). 
For example, sunlight can cause freckles, but the inverse is not true: freckles cannot cause 




semantic, and perhaps even structural, representation of these relations in that the ordering is 
integral in extracting meaning; unlike in asymmetrical general associative relations. A 
superficial analogy that can illustrate this point is that in multiplication, like general 
association, one can reverse the terms involved and still derive the same result. However, in 
division, like causal relations, if one reverses the order of the operands, the result will be 
fundamentally different.  
In a series of three experiments, Fenker et al., (2005) explored this asymmetry in 
causal relations using a relation recognition paradigm. The authors recorded the response 
times of participants while they determined whether or not word pairs that were roughly equal 
in directional associative strength could be causally or associatively related. They found that 
when queried specifically if a causal relation could exist, word pairs presented in the 
predictive, cause-effect order were accessed, and identified as potentially causally related, 
faster than when the same pairs were presented in the diagnostic, effect-cause order. However, 
when asked if an associative relation could exist between the same word pairs, no differences 
in response times were observed as a function of directionality. As the stimuli were normed to 
be bidirectionally equal in associative strength, these data were taken as evidence that causal 
relations were distinct from general associative relations, and that general association did not 
underlie the predictive priming advantage found with causal relations.     
Although this study provided compelling evidence that unidirectional association (or 
unequal associative strength) was not responsible for the observed effects, it did not provide 
any test as to the nature of the representation underlying the asymmetry in causal relations nor 
if this type of asymmetry differs in its representation from the type of asymmetry that was 




word pairs as a control makes any inferences regarding differentiation between these types of 
asymmetries beyond the scope of their investigation. Moreover, Fenker et al.’s choice of a 
1000 millisecond (ms) SOA (which in this paradigm translates to how long the first word is 
present before it is replaced by the second) leaves open the possibility that the direction effects 
observed could be a reflection of expectancy; that is, the ability of participants to predict 
effects from causes compared to predicting causes from effects.  
The role of expectancy is often discussed in traditional semantic priming and word 
recognition research (e.g., Becker, 1980), but I feel that its importance within the context of 
the relation recognition paradigm is worth consideration. If participants more effectively 
predict the ensuing target word when presented with a cause than when presented with an 
effect, the predictive advantage described could merely be a reflection of this ability. 
However, if this RT advantage persists despite limiting participants’ ability to effectively 
predict ensuing targets, this would constitute strong evidence that the predictive advantage is 
capturing something reflective of the representation of causal relations themselves, rather than 














 Sixty undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo participated in this 
experiment for course credit. Data from 12 participants had to be replaced due to higher than 
25% error rate in at least one condition. All participants had normal, or corrected to normal 
vision, and spoke English as a first language.  
Design     
 The current study used a 2 (Task: associative vs. causal) x 2 (SOA: 150 ms vs. 1000 
ms) x 2 (Direction: predictive/forward vs. diagnostic/backward) within-subjects design. All 
subjects made both causal and associative judgments at both SOAs and judged all word pairs. 
The Task variable was blocked and block order was counterbalanced. The order of 
presentation of each word pair in each condition was randomized, as was the SOA used in 
each trial. The specific items appearing at each SOA and in each direction were 
counterbalanced across participants, whereby participants saw different word pairs in different 
directions at different SOAs.  
Stimuli 
Causal stimuli. The causal stimuli consisted of 64 causally related word pairs and 64 
weakly associated word pairs adapted from Fenker et al. (2005) which are included as 
Appendix A. Weakly associated pairs were used as the filler stimuli rather than unrelated word 
pairs to prevent participants from being able to use association as a cue to causality. These 
stimuli were originally selected from the USF Word Association Norms List (Nelson et al., 




bidirectional statistical contingency. For a more detailed review of the norming procedures 
please refer to Fenker et al. (2005).  
 Unidirectionally associated stimuli (UDA). The UDA and unrelated word pairs used 
were adapted from Kahan, Neely and Forsythe (1999) and are included as Appendix B. With 
these word pairs, Kahan et al. found that the average probability of responding with the target 
given the prime was 17%, whereas the average probability of responding with the prime given 
the target was only 1%. These response patterns clearly demonstrate the asymmetry in that an 
association exists in the forwards (prime to target) direction and not in the backwards (target 
to prime) direction.  
Unrelated word pairs were used as filler items in an effort to make the task roughly 
equal in nature to that of the causal task. Pilot testing was conducted in which the UDA word 
pairs and unrelated word pairs from Kahan et al. (1999) were rated on the degree to which 
they were associated in a forwards direction and in a backwards direction. Judgments were 
made using an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating a response of “not 
associated” and 10 indicating a response of “highly associated”. Each word pair was rated in 
either direction by an independent sample of twenty-five undergraduate students from the 
University of Waterloo. There were 120 UDA word pairs and 120 unrelated word pairs 
(originally from Kahan et al., 1999) included in the pilot study. Of these pairs, 64 of the most 
strongly unidirectionally related pairs were selected to serve as the critical stimuli and 64 of 
the pairs deemed to be least related were selected to serve as fillers.  
Procedure 
Half of the participants completed the associative task first, and the other half 




assess whether a causal or associative relation (depending on the condition) could exist 
between the words presented in the ensuing pairs. To ensure that participants understood that 
valid causal pairs could be presented bidirectionally (i.e., cause-effect, or effect-cause order), 
participants were told to assess “whether the event described by the first word could cause or 
could be caused by the event described by the other word”. If further clarification was 
required, participants were told to decide if one of the words in a given pair could cause the 
other. In the associative condition, participants were asked to assess “whether they believed an 
associative relation could exist between the presented word pairs”. 
 Once the task commenced, participants saw a fixation point in black font in the center 
of a white screen for 1000 ms after which the screen was blank for 500 ms. The first word then 
appeared in Arial Black font size 24, on a white background, for either 150 ms or 1000 ms and 
the second word was presented immediately after (i.e., 0 ms inter-stimulus-interval). The 
second word remained on the screen until the participant responded. If subjects believed the 
items could be causally/associatively related, they were to press the letter “C” on the 
keyboard. If they believed the items not to be causally/associatively related, they were to press 












Response Times (RTs) 
 The analysis of RTs excluded all incorrect responses and any outliers that were more 
than two standard deviations above or below each participant’s mean within each task and 
condition. This outlier criterion resulted in the removal of approximately 3% of trials. Table 1 
presents the mean RTs, percentage errors, difference scores, and as the percentage reduction 
from the slower, diagnostic/backward order to the predictive/forward (% Reduction). For 
individual subject means, please refer to Appendix C for RT’s in the Associative task as a 
function of direction at each SOA, and refer to Appendix D for RT’s in the Causal task as a 
function of direction at each SOA. 
 A 2 (Task: associative vs. causal) x 2 (SOA: 150 ms vs. 1000 ms) x 2 (Direction: 
predictive/forward vs. diagnostic/backward) within-subjects ANOVA was performed on the 
RT data. Analyses revealed significant main effects of Task, F(1, 59) = 118.21, MSE= 244614, 
p < .001, pη2 = .67, SOA, F(1, 59) = 39.82, MSE = 22447, p < .001, pη2 = .40, and Direction, 
F(1, 59) = 33.79, MSE = 17995, p < .001, pη2 = .36. Also present were significant interactions 
between Task and SOA, F(1, 59) = 8.04, MSE = 21995, p = .006, pη2 = .12, and Task and 
Direction, F(1, 59) = 6.10, MSE = 22357, p = .016, pη2 = .09. The interaction between SOA 
and Direction (F < 1), and Task, SOA, and Direction, and was not significant, F(1, 59) = 1.19, 
MSE = 22047, p = .28, pη2 = .02. For the complete ANOVA table please refer to Appendix E. 
Based on the significant Task x SOA and Task x Direction interactions, and to test our key 
predictions regarding the impact of Direction and SOA for each Task, two separate 2 x 2 
ANOVAs were carried out for each Task, with SOA and Direction as factors. The critical 





















Table 1. Data summary 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
                                                      Causal Judgment Task                                Associative Judgment Task 
                                              ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
                                             150 ms SOA                1000 ms SOA                150 ms SOA                  1000 ms SOA        
                                            --------------------          --------------------            --------------------            ------------------        
                                             RT        % Error          RT       % Error               RT     % Error               RT    % Error                                                                                         
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
Predictive/Forwards        1334           14.8         1215           12.3              853              8.5             781              8.3 
Diagnostic/Backwards     1444           18.0         1314           17.9              867              9.7             843              9.1 
Difference                           110             3.2            99              5.6                14              1.2               62              0.8 
% Reduction                      7.6                              7.5                                  1.6                                 7.4 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------                                 
Note - Mean RTs (in milliseconds), Percentage Errors, Difference scores, and Percentage Reduction in Mean RT 














tasks. The absence of this interaction would imply that the size of the direction effect 
does not vary as a function of SOA, whereas the presence of this interaction would constitute 
evidence that the magnitude of the direction effect depends on the SOA. In the Causal Task, 
the SOA x Direction was clearly insignificant, F < 1, p = .81, pη2 = .001. In the Associative 
Task, however, the SOA x Direction interaction was significant, F(1, 59) = 4.45, MSE= 7839, 
p < .05, pη2 = .07. 
To follow up these analyses, a series of planned paired sample t-tests were conducted 
to investigate the precise effect of the SA manipulation on RT for each type of stimuli in each 
direction. Within the Causal Task, significant differences were found as a function of direction 
at both SOAs. Specifically, in the 1000 ms SOA condition, RTs were approximately 99 ms 
faster for predictive trials (M = 1215 ms) than for diagnostic trials (M = 1314 ms), t(59) = 
2.58, SE = 38.55, p = .012. In the 150 ms SOA condition, RTs were approximately 110 ms 
faster for predictive trials (M = 1334 ms) than for diagnostic trials (M = 1444 ms), t(59) = 
4.07, SE = 27.12, p < .001. In contrast, in the associative task significant differences between 
the directions were only obtained at the long SOA. Specifically, in the 1000 ms SOA 
condition, RTs were approximately 62 ms faster for forwards trials (M = 781 ms) than for 
backwards trials (M = 843 ms), t(59) = 4.18, SE = 14.74, p < .001. However, in the 150 ms 
SOA condition, RTs for forwards (M = 853 ms) and backwards (M = 867 ms), trials were 
clearly not significantly different, t(59) = 1.06, SE = 12.68, p = .295.  
An alternative way to analyse these data is to re-express the observed RT difference 
between the predictive/forward and the diagnostic/backward direction as a percentage 
reduction from the RT of the slower, diagnostic/backward order (see % Reduction in Table 1). 




Specifically, in the causal task, at the long and short SOAs respectively, a 7.5% and 7.6% 
reduction as a function of direction exists. In the associative task, at the long SOA, a 7.4% 
reduction occurs, however, at the short SOA, only a 1.6% reduction in RT occurs as a function 
of direction. As such, there is a clear dissociation in the manner in which these different types 
of asymmetries impact RTs. 
Errors   
A parallel 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA conducted on the error data revealed a significant main 
effect of Task, F(1, 59) = 19.44, MSE= 290.66, p < .001, pη2 = .25, with significantly more 
errors being made in the causal task than in the associative task. Also present were main 
effects of Direction, F(1, 59) = 14.86, MSE= 58.65, p < .001, pη2 = .20, and an interaction 
between Task and Direction, F(1, 59) = 4.75, MSE= 69.03, p < .05, pη2 = .08. Paired samples 
t-tests revealed that this interaction was due to the finding that no significant differences 
existed as a function of direction within the associative task at either SOA (Largest t = 1.11, p 
= .27), but, in the causal task more errors were made on diagnostic than predictive trials at 
both the 150 ms SOA, t(59) = 2.19, SE = 1.45, p < .05, and the 1000 ms SOA, t(59) = 2.78, SE 
= 1.98, p < .01. As such, the error data are in line with those from the RT analysis. In the 
causal task, direction impacted accuracy in that participants performed more poorly when 
pairs were presented in the diagnostic than in the predictive order, but in the associative task, 
direction had no effect upon accuracy. This dissociation lends further support to the idea that 
the asymmetry in causal relations is represented as an integral part of these relations but that 







The representation of causal structure in semantic memory has been, and continues to 
be, a topic of much debate. Specifically, whether the inherent asymmetry of causal relations is 
a feature represented in semantic memory that is substantively distinct from asymmetries 
present in other domains (e.g., unidirectional associative strength) remains to be seen. I 
propose that one way in which these types of asymmetries might be distinct is the level at 
which direction is impacting responses (i.e., at the level of representation or access). If an 
asymmetry is intimately tied to the structure or meaning of that relation, one would expect that 
responses regarding those relations to be relatively immune to manipulations that limit higher-
order processes, such as expectancy. If however, directional information is not intimately tied 
to the structure or meaning of that relation, manipulations that limit higher-order processes, 
such as expectancy, should impact direction effects as they are likely tied to how that 
directional information is accessed.  
Our results support the notion that causal asymmetry is distinct from unequal 
associative strength, and that the directional information in these relations are likely 
represented in distinct ways. Specifically, on the long SOA trials, both causal and associative 
judgments exhibited an effect of direction with an RT advantage for word pairs present in the 
predictive/forwards order. However, on trials using short SOAs, an effect of direction was 
only observed for causal trials, and not unidirectional associates. These findings indicate that 
directional advantages associated with asymmetrical associative strength may be contingent 
upon one’s ability to use expectancy-based strategies and generate potential targets that fulfill 
the requirements of the relation in question. As such, this type of directional effect seems to be 




paradigm and are likely a result of the manner in which participants access these relations. It is 
likely that participants are better able to predict a target based on a prime when presented in 
the forwards order, as compared to backwards, and this ability could be responsible for the RT 
advantage on these trials. This explanation seems to be the most parsimonious and is in accord 
with the results of a norming study conducted on these and other words in which Kahan et al. 
found that the average probability of responding with the target given the prime was 17%, 
whereas the average probability of responding with the prime given the target was only 1%. 
Conversely, the type of directional effects exerted upon RTs for causal judgments does not 
hinge upon higher-order strategic processes and is unaffected by conscious attempts to 
generate targets that fulfill the required roles. As this directional advantage was robust to the 
SOA manipulation, I would argue that this advantage has more to do with the representation 
of this directional information in semantic memory. In light of the significant difference in 
overall RT between the tasks, it is important to note that the directional effects observed are 
interpreted as indexing the relative speed with which direction is influencing judgments, 
which is distinct from the absolute speed of the judgment task. Put another way, it is the speed 
with which a feature of the representation (direction) of the relation becomes activated, not 
overall task speed in which we are focusing upon (see Schwarz & Ischebeck, 2003, for a 
similar argument regarding the relative influence of separate components of relation 
information in number comparison). 
The fact that the inherent asymmetry of causal relations is a facet of the representation 
of these relations seems logical in that the meaning of causal relations, and thus their utility in 
guiding action, is crucially dependent on the alignment of the constituent parts of the relation 




of the order in which they are aligned. The direction effects within the associative task may be 
a result of a familiarity-based mechanism due to increased exposure to these pairs in the 
familiar forward order in language (e.g., as commonly found in writing and speech). If one 
considers the large variance in language across cultures, it seems likely that effects of this 
nature would be heavily dependent upon the predominant ordering of word pairs in normal 
writing and speech within a particular language, and thus, would have variant patterns of 
results if the same stimulus sets were directly translated. It would seem that, unlike 
asymmetries due to unidirectional associative strength, the asymmetry of causal relations (at 
least those mechanistic in nature) transcend language in that no matter the tongue in which it is 
spoken, causal relations are still inherently tied to the constituent roles at play. Indeed, support 
for this notion comes from previous work demonstrating that causal perceptions are largely 
invariant across cultures (Morris & Peng, 1994). 
Evidence that the structural representation of causal relations might be contributing to 
the observed latency differences in the causal task also comes from recent work aimed at 
determining the neural correlates of evaluating causal and associative relations in semantic 
memory. Satpute et al., (2005) employed a causal and associative relation recognition task 
while participants were scanned using fMRI. Unique activation in the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLFPC) and the right precuneus were observed when judging causal as 
opposed to associative relations. They argued that these unique activations link the access of 
causal relations with regions of the brain known to be implicated in role-binding (left 
DLFPC). The DLPFC activation is also consistent with the view that this binding requires 




the view, however, that the binding process per se requires extra working memory in that my 
data suggests that the binding process is likely is an integral part of the representation itself.  
A longstanding debate exists between researchers advocating two broad theoretical 
perspectives regarding the nature of causal representation. Proponents of associative theories 
posit that the constituent parts of a causal relation are mapped onto the temporally defined cue 
or outcome roles, which can be either causes or effects (e.g., Shanks & López, 1996). This 
temporal precedence creates asymmetries in associative strength, and it is this asymmetry that 
has implications in subsequent access of these relations. In contrast, the causal-model view 
(Waldmann & Holyoak, 1992) proposes that people explicitly encode the specific roles of 
cause and effect to events and use this knowledge in subsequent scenarios to guide their 
judgments of causality. Here, the cause-effect asymmetry is a result of these binding roles 
impacting behavior. Although I acknowledge the importance of this debate, I feel that the 
present investigation need not directly appeal to either of these perspectives. That being said, 
the implications of these findings for either theory is open to debate, and future theoretical 
work on this topic would be well served to explicitly examine the degree to which causal-
model and associative theories of causal knowledge can accommodate the present findings.   
One possible avenue for future research could be the utilization of a more parametric 
distribution of SOAs to establish the boundary conditions of the phenomena described herein. 
In the current study, we attempted to select two SOAs designed to differentiate between 
scenarios where expectancy could easily be active, and those in which it is much less likely to 
be operational. By parametrically varying the SOA, one could garner an understanding of 




Subsequent research on this topic should also attempt to situate these judgments in a 
more ecologically valid setting in which context plays a role. It is well known that context 
alters one’s perception of association. For example, Balota & Lorch (1986) demonstrated that 
subjective ratings of associative strength are influenced by the strength of association of other 
items in the list. Similar contextual factors also likely influence causal judgments. If one 
considers social causal scenarios in particular, it may be especially likely that context could 
have a significant role. Future work could endeavor to systematically vary the causal strength 
of the candidate pairs, and determine if the directional advantages observed here varies as a 
function of this variability in causal strength. Based on the data and arguments outlined here, it 
is likely that variance would be observed in the response and the absolute speed of judgments 
as a function of causal power; however, I would predict that the directional advantages 
observed here would be immune to such variations in context.  
A related issue that also pertains to the generalizability of these results is the 
differentiation between explicit speeded judgments, such as that employed here, and more 
implicit measures designed to indirectly measure the impact of these various types of 
asymmetries on behavior. As the correlation between one’s explicit judgments pertaining to 
such tasks and one’s implicit processing of such stimuli is far from transparent, it would be 
theoretically informative to see if similar dissociations between associative and causal 
relations would be reported if participants engaged in some kind of implicit task.  
In summary, these results, although pertaining to causal relations specifically, provide 
broader insight into the way that asymmetrical relations in semantic memory may be 
represented and become manifest. To determine more precisely how various kinds of 




manipulations could be used to explore other types of semantic relations that have inherent 
asymmetries; including categorical, taxonomic and functional relations. Furthermore, the 
current study, and future research examining various asymmetrical associations in semantic 
memory, will aid in the development of more comprehensive computational models that 
attempt to mirror human semantic memory.  
To date, relatively little work has focused directly on the relations between concepts 
stored in semantic memory (see Spellman, Holyoak, & Morrison, 2001), and as such, it is 
unsurprising that a paucity of research exists that focuses on more specific aspects of such 
relations, including the types of asymmetries that impact them. Future research on semantic 
memory will be well served to refine its focus onto such components and begin to decompose 
the subtleties that comprise semantic relations; as Fenker et al. (2005) astutely noted: “It is 
important to identify both the commonalities and differences among the varied semantic 
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Sub-set of word pairs used in Fenker, D., Waldmann, M., and Holyoak, K. (2005). Accessing 
causal relations in semantic memory. Memory & Cognition, 33(6), 1036-1046. (Original 
Source: Nelson, D.L., McEvoy, C.L. and Schreiber, T.A. (1998).)  
Causal Word Pairs    Weak Associate Filler Pairs  
absence withdrawal   acrobat athletes 
alcohol accident   apple  computer 
attack  defense   atlas  dictionary 
bacteria infection   baptist  protestants  
bang  deafness   basketball teams 
beat  bruise    bicycle vehicle 
betrayal distrust   caffeine mountain 
birthrate population   chipmunks acorn 
carcinogen tumor    claw  dogs 
chromosome gender    control  volume 
compliment blush    corona  lime 
crime  arrest    course  session 
crush  damage   curve  shape 
dairy  diarrhea   decency respect 
diet  hunger    elevator floor 
disease injection   email  attachment 
drought famine    employment office 
drug  relief    fight  dagger 
education career    forecast weather 
eyedrops dilation   fruits  cocktails 
fertilizer growth    furniture bedroom 
fracture cast    gallon  ounce 
frequency pitch    gazelle  antelope 
frowning wrinkles   girl  maid 
gang  riot    glass  window 
gases  explosion   gossip  newspaper  
gold  wealth    gown  graduation 
hormones mood    grab  pull 
humidity sweat    groceries money 
illness  treatment   hypothesis test 
invitation visit    insurance estimate 
joke  amusement   kill  theft 
lamp  heat    kindness sympathy 




lightning fire    lettuce  vegetables 
magnet attraction   lover  girlfriend 
moon  tide    officers uniforms 
movie  nightmare   painting wall 
mutation cancer    passage story 
nuts  allergy    patty  hamburger 
order  delivery   pituitary glands 
panic  escape    plane  car 
period  cramps   planter  farmer 
pollution asthma    potatoes ground 
pressure bursting   power  voltage 
sadness crying    propeller helicopter 
salt  thirst    ring  emerald 
scratch  blood    roar  engine 
shampoo tears    rush  ambulance 
shock  scream    screw  round 
spice  flavor    seaman harbour 
spill  stain    security force 
sprain  swell    shrimp  ocean 
stress  fatigue    sibling  family 
study  pass    skyscraper towers 
sunlight freckles   soup  cracker 
sweets  cavity    spray  roach 
training fitness    terms  meaning 
trash  stink    tomatoes sandwich 
trauma  coma    tote  umbrella 
UVlight tanning   tuba  saxophone 
vacuum suction   vein  vessel 
virus  epidemic   wife  mother 























Sub-set of pairs used in Kahan, T., Neely, J., & Forsythe, W. (1999). Dissociated backward 
priming effects in lexical decision and pronunciation tasks. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 
6(1), 105-110. 
Unidirectional Associates   Unrelated Filler Pairs  
acre  land    agriculture girl 
alright  okay    ambulance window 
anatomy body    ankle  farming 
anger  mad    archer  phonebook 
antique old    architect doorbell 
ashtray cigarette   bank  rise 
behind  front    bars  lettuce 
blaze  fire    basin  academy 
brief  short    bearing lamb 
campus school    bike  report 
cent  penny    brush  dices 
cigar  smoke    bubble  velvet 
closed  open    caffeine sky 
cobweb spider    cats  roles 
component part    ceiling  king 
conclude end    chef  fear 
consider think    child  eagle 
contact touch    compass beauty 
cork  wine    consulate door 
corpse  dead    cookie  nose 
correct  wrong    couch  dough 
crescent moon    curve  lead 
differ  same    dancer  liquid 
dilemma problem   deer  pencil 
dine  eat    diamond gear 
document paper    disgust  latin 
elk  deer    drill  guest 
finished done    elbow  pistol 
fracture break    force  elevator 
galaxy  stars    garage  harbor 
gossip  talk    glass  rush 
harp  music    grab  screw 
hawk  bird    grass  fist 




jupiter  planet    ground  disk 
lily  flower    gymnastic vegetables 
lips  kiss    insurance icecream 
medium large    justice  mousepad 
meow  cat    kill  clock 
nap  sleep    kite  basket 
palm  hand    lemon  soccer 
post  office    liar  eggs 
powerful strong    light  mouse 
quill  pen    map  clown 
racquet ball    maths  landscape 
request ask    medicine passage 
sentry  guard    mile  apron 
shears  scissors   miracle ginger 
shrink  small    mouth  actor 
shutter  window   needle  currency 
skull  head    patty  kitchen 
slay  kill    penny  diabetes 
sole  shoes    piano  money 
spicy  hot    planter  power 
strike  hit    point  queen  
survive live    priming investor 
syringe needle    printer  angel 
tax  money    pull  leather 
tickle  laugh    radiation jockey 
trousers pants    revolting roach 
truthful honest    river  leopard 
unite  together   sailor  glands 
watt  bulb    switch  phone 






















Individual subject mean RT’s in the Associative task as a function of direction at each SOA 
 
Subject 
Assoc. 150 ms 
Forward 
Assoc. 150 ms 
Backward 
Assoc. 1000 ms 
Forward 
Assoc. 1000 ms 
Backward 
1 913 663 712 977 
2 979 963 754 980 
3 1018 1124 1079 1115 
4 905 918 869 967 
5 642 614 504 578 
6 750 794 685 745 
7 532 547 517 537 
8 757 745 749 778 
9 791 873 747 828 
10 725 762 705 751 
11 563 564 516 600 
12 753 811 714 737 
13 725 721 785 805 
14 1103 1226 949 921 
15 836 854 738 701 
16 829 852 696 888 
17 796 766 741 793 
18 671 734 629 683 
19 1053 965 962 930 
20 902 862 912 882 
21 882 988 875 843 
22 1022 984 952 884 
23 765 910 704 737 
24 801 799 790 797 
25 785 990 1005 948 
26 769 746 755 703 
27 753 937 816 751 
28 760 889 881 769 
29 1050 946 869 827 
30 734 857 761 840 
31 1026 1190 1089 1180 
32 1032 1215 1312 1136 
33 939 848 778 859 
34 1075 894 751 946 
35 1115 1135 923 1134 
36 676 745 594 640 




38 913 871 760 792 
39 806 934 783 873 
40 1048 978 868 782 
41 773 640 567 613 
42 823 826 746 721 
43 1243 1173 960 1067 
44 804 762 540 1016 
45 737 814 754 785 
46 1234 1161 1072 1449 
47 664 724 715 707 
48 732 716 634 712 
49 737 867 775 898 
50 803 837 715 865 
51 673 687 637 643 
52 907 773 802 849 
53 1045 947 935 1081 
54 756 792 620 797 
55 860 867 769 708 
56 822 968 827 894 
57 704 824 657 778 
58 1071 842 747 1027 
59 734 755 723 676 



























Individual subject mean RT’s in the Causal task as a function of direction at each SOA 
 
Subject 
Causal 150 ms 
Predictive 
Causal 150 ms 
Diagnostic 
Causal 1000 ms 
Predictive 
Causal 1000 ms 
Diagnostic 
1 1492 2212 1402 1498 
2 1644 1616 1663 1295 
3 1719 1968 1391 1720 
4 1628 1602 1993 1499 
5 1043 939 663 767 
6 1092 1243 943 980 
7 874 1087 806 903 
8 1045 1442 1154 1425 
9 1250 1379 1070 1187 
10 1075 1349 976 982 
11 1007 948 852 886 
12 1418 1328 1164 1301 
13 927 1053 1038 1201 
14 1557 1928 1180 1424 
15 1562 1576 1213 1822 
16 1388 1263 1190 1262 
17 1178 1209 1074 1419 
18 1041 1074 794 824 
19 1264 1237 1296 1097 
20 1951 2331 1747 1878 
21 1311 1615 1163 1135 
22 2675 2627 1718 1802 
23 1253 1191 1013 1081 
24 973 1213 882 1422 
25 2408 2181 1621 2103 
26 1144 1274 1130 1057 
27 1216 1361 1157 1510 
28 1488 1470 1214 1358 
29 1430 1484 1488 1564 
30 1064 1055 878 1078 
31 1857 2232 1728 1413 
32 1017 942 1016 1205 
33 1309 1840 1219 1665 
34 2026 2053 1398 1630 
35 2540 2330 2312 2357 
36 1332 1263 1006 1008 




38 1419 1367 1268 1327 
39 1641 2060 1713 1666 
40 907 1069 893 1192 
41 1177 1023 728 1129 
42 1210 1040 877 837 
43 1515 1940 1936 1591 
44 1196 1184 1195 891 
45 1051 1016 1018 1044 
46 1542 1859 1510 1366 
47 791 872 1045 924 
48 976 1099 1068 1143 
49 1012 1330 1120 1166 
50 1011 1029 1011 1155 
51 793 870 824 650 
52 844 875 887 929 
53 2597 3200 2035 3519 
54 963 923 967 930 
55 789 786 594 919 
56 1245 1512 1208 1356 
57 945 996 880 1017 
58 1082 1281 1019 1151 
59 1324 1463 1045 1154 































Tests of Within-Subjects Effects 
Measure:MEASURE_1 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Task Sphericity 
Assumed 
2.892E7 1 2.892E7 118.211 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
2.892E7 1 2.892E7 118.211 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 2.892E7 1 2.892E7 118.211 .000 
Lower-bound 2.892E7 1 2.892E7 118.211 .000 
Error(Task) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1.443E7 59 244614.021   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1.443E7 59 244614.021   
Huynh-Feldt 1.443E7 59 244614.021   
Lower-bound 1.443E7 59 244614.021   
SOA Sphericity 
Assumed 
893761.909 1 893761.909 39.816 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
893761.909 1 893761.909 39.816 .000 
Huynh-Feldt 893761.909 1 893761.909 39.816 .000 
Lower-bound 893761.909 1 893761.909 39.816 .000 
Error(SOA) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1324375.719 59 22447.046   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1324375.719 59 22447.046   
Huynh-Feldt 1324375.719 59 22447.046   
Lower-bound 1324375.719 59 22447.046   
Direction Sphericity 
Assumed 
607964.718 1 607964.718 33.786 .000 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
607964.718 1 607964.718 33.786 .000 




Lower-bound 607964.718 1 607964.718 33.786 .000 
Error(Direction) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1061679.578 59 17994.569   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1061679.578 59 17994.569   
Huynh-Feldt 1061679.578 59 17994.569   
Lower-bound 1061679.578 59 17994.569   
Task * SOA Sphericity 
Assumed 
176840.673 1 176840.673 8.040 .006 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
176840.673 1 176840.673 8.040 .006 
Huynh-Feldt 176840.673 1 176840.673 8.040 .006 
Lower-bound 176840.673 1 176840.673 8.040 .006 
Error(Task*SOA) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1297678.448 59 21994.550   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1297678.448 59 21994.550   
Huynh-Feldt 1297678.448 59 21994.550   
Lower-bound 1297678.448 59 21994.550   
Task * Direction Sphericity 
Assumed 
136298.655 1 136298.655 6.096 .016 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
136298.655 1 136298.655 6.096 .016 
Huynh-Feldt 136298.655 1 136298.655 6.096 .016 
Lower-bound 136298.655 1 136298.655 6.096 .016 
Error(Task*Direction) Sphericity 
Assumed 
1319082.509 59 22357.331   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1319082.509 59 22357.331   
Huynh-Feldt 1319082.509 59 22357.331   
Lower-bound 1319082.509 59 22357.331   
SOA * Direction Sphericity 
Assumed 
10390.662 1 10390.662 .666 .418 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
10390.662 1 10390.662 .666 .418 
Huynh-Feldt 10390.662 1 10390.662 .666 .418 






920213.441 59 15596.838   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
920213.441 59 15596.838   
Huynh-Feldt 920213.441 59 15596.838   
Lower-bound 920213.441 59 15596.838   
Task * SOA * Direction Sphericity 
Assumed 
26256.710 1 26256.710 1.191 .280 
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
26256.710 1 26256.710 1.191 .280 
Huynh-Feldt 26256.710 1 26256.710 1.191 .280 





1300788.149 59 22047.257   
Greenhouse-
Geisser 
1300788.149 59 22047.257   
Huynh-Feldt 1300788.149 59 22047.257   
Lower-bound 1300788.149 59 22047.257   
 
 
